IronClaw

What is IronClaw?

IronClaw is an open-source secure runtime for running AI agents inside encrypted Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) on NEAR AI Cloud. Its core purpose is to help you use agent workflows that “actually do things” while keeping your credentials protected from the agent and from prompt-injection-based credential theft.

Rather than relying on telling the AI not to leak secrets, IronClaw places credentials in an encrypted vault and injects them into requests only at an approved network boundary. It also runs agent tools in sandboxed Wasm containers with capability-style permissions and allowlisted endpoints.

Key Features

• Encrypted vault for credentials: API keys, tokens, and passwords are encrypted at rest and remain invisible to the AI; IronClaw injects credentials only where you’ve allowed.
• Encrypted Trusted Execution Environment (TEE): Your IronClaw instance runs inside a TEE on NEAR AI Cloud, with encryption in memory from boot to shutdown.
• Network allowlisting (endpoint-level control): Tools can only reach endpoints you pre-approve, limiting “silent phone-home” and reducing unintended data movement.
• Sandboxed tools with Wasm containers: Each tool runs in its own Wasm environment with capability-based permissions, allowlisted endpoints, and strict resource limits.
• Leak detection for outbound traffic: Outbound requests are scanned in real time; suspicious secret-like data headed outward is blocked automatically.
• Memory-safety-oriented implementation (Rust + verification): IronClaw is built in Rust and includes checks such as Wasm validation and blocking unsafe content in the runtime flow.

How to Use IronClaw

1. Deploy IronClaw on NEAR AI Cloud using the one-click cloud deployment flow.
2. Configure your allowed endpoints and credentials for the agent using IronClaw’s configuration—place API keys/tokens/passwords into the encrypted vault and specify which endpoints are permitted.
3. Run your agent through the IronClaw instance so tools execute in sandboxed Wasm containers and credentials are injected only for approved requests.

If you prefer local operation, the site also states IronClaw can be run locally, but the provided content does not include local-specific setup steps.

Use Cases

• Personal AI assistant that can call external services: Use OpenClaw-style browsing/research/coding/automation while keeping API keys and tokens out of the agent’s direct view.
• Agent workflows that use multiple third-party APIs: Define an allowlist of endpoints so each tool can only access the specific services you intend.
• Projects that rely on third-party “skills” or tools: Reduce the risk that a compromised or malicious tool can exfiltrate credentials by isolating tools and restricting outbound access.
• Teams running agents against sensitive environments: Catch suspected secret leakage in outbound traffic and prevent data from leaving through unapproved channels.
• Experimentation with agent capabilities without widening exposure: Provide “full agentic behavior” for actions, while focusing controls on where credentials are injected and what endpoints are reachable.

FAQ

Is IronClaw a replacement for OpenClaw?
IronClaw is positioned as a secure, open-source alternative to OpenClaw for running an OpenClaw-style personal AI assistant with additional credential-protection mechanics.

How does IronClaw prevent credential theft from prompt injection?
The agent does not receive raw credentials. Credentials are stored in an encrypted vault and injected at the host boundary only for endpoints on an allowlist, so prompt-based attempts to reveal secrets have less to access.

What security boundaries does IronClaw use?
The site describes encrypted TEEs for the instance, sandboxed tools running in Wasm containers, and endpoint allowlisting to control where tool traffic can go.

Does IronClaw scan outbound traffic?
Yes. The site states that outbound traffic is scanned in real time and anything that looks like a secret heading out is blocked automatically.

Where can IronClaw be deployed?
The page states it can run on NEAR AI Cloud (with one-click deployment) and can also be run locally.

Alternatives

• OpenClaw run without additional isolation: This is the closest referenced alternative in the source. It may provide similar agent capabilities, but the page highlights higher risks of credential exposure from prompt injection and malicious skills.
• Other secure-runtime / TEE-based agent approaches: Instead of credential-injection at the network boundary, you can look for runtimes that execute agent code within secure enclaves or hardware-backed isolation.
• Network-restricted agent setups (proxy/firewall allowlisting): Rather than an encrypted-vault + TEE model, some setups focus on restricting outbound destinations via network controls; this may reduce exfiltration paths but doesn’t address the “agent can see credentials” problem the page calls out.
• Application-layer secret management (redaction/secrets vaults without TEEs): These alternatives aim to protect secrets via vaulting and access policies, but may differ from IronClaw’s stated enforcement model around enclave execution, sandboxed tools, and outbound leak detection.